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I. INTRODUCTION 
This case involves the death of a small boy, Michael Hall, who had not yet 
reached his third birthday. He had surgery for a non-mortal wound and following 
the surgery he was sedated for some 92 hours in the ICU with a drug not 
indicated for the long-term sedation of pediatric patients. His physicians were 
unaware of the general properties of the drug. They did no research to educate 
themselves about those properties. They ignored critical laboratory and other 
reports showing that the boy, intubated and unable to speak, was in distress. 
They took no steps to correct dangerously low blood pressures, and omitted 
other corrective measures. After they signed off the case leaving the boy in the 
care of other physicians, but still maintaining him on the drug which was not 
indicated for long-term pediatric sedation, the boy was observed to be brain 
dead. His brain had been deprived of necessary oxygen and had become 
swollen to the point where it could no longer function. 
A verdict was rendered against the Defendant doctors on September 19, 
1977 after an eleven day trial. Approximately four months later, the district court 
entertained oral argument on the Defendants' motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. Approximately two months later, and without the 
benefit of a transcript of the trial testimony, the district court rendered its decision 
granting the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. An appeal was 
quickly filed and this document now completes the briefing cycle on appeal. 
The Defendants at trial were represented by two distinct law firms. The 
attorney for Defendant Griffiths subsequently left her firm and was employed by 
the Moffat, Thomas firm - the firm representing Defendant Curnow. 
Notwithstanding any potential conflicts of interest, two Respondents' briefs have 
now been filed by the same law firm, albeit by different authors. The issues 
remain the same as to both Respondents, however, and Appellant will file only 
this one, single Reply Brief answering the arguments propounded by each 
Respondent. 
As the Respondents have strayed from the true issue on this appeal, 
every effort will be made to confine this Reply Brief to that issue. Where the 
Respondents have taken different tacks, however, a brief reply will be noted 
where necessary. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The resolution of this appeal turns upon the sole issue of whether there 
was substantial, competent evidence to support the jury's verdict. 
In this Reply Brief, the Appellants note that the medical doctors who are 
Respondents on appeal have impermissibly attempted to change the focus of 
review from the sole question of the substantiality and competence of the 
evidence admitted at trial to a review of competing and contradictory evidence as 
to causation and whether the Defendants met applicable standards of care. 
As will be argued, infra, "Where there is conflicting evidence, the court is 
required [under Rule 50(b)] to construe all of the evidence in favor of the jury 
verdict, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, to determine whether there 
is substantial evidence to support the verdict." Watson v. Navistar International 
Transportation Corporation, 121 Idaho 659, 661, 827 P.2d 656, 699 (1992). The 
requisite standard is whether the evidence preceding the verdict is of sufficient 
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could reach the same 
conclusion as the jury did in the case under consideration. Id. 
The trial court - joined by the Respondents - has stated that in order to 
prevail in this case the Appellants needed to have peer-reviewed scientific 
journal evidence linking the application of the sedative drug Propofol to the death 
of Michael Hall. Rejected was Plaintiffs' experts' testimony which was admitted 
at trial under I.RE. 702 and which was based upon the medical sciences of 
hematology, physiology, anesthesiology, chemistry, toxicology, biology, 
microbiology, pulmonology, cardiology and pathology as somehow not 
sufficiently "scientific" so as to support the jury verdict. If true, this would ignore 
the law of this jurisdiction as enunciated and reenunciated and approved and 
reapproved by this Court in numerous cases which hold, generally, that medical 
doctors can testify regarding the cause of death or injury and that this testimony 
is both substantial and competent. 
B. WHAT IS THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURT? 
In Appellants' opening brief at p. 1, the issue :.... the single issue - on 
appeal was correctly stated as: "Was there substantial, competent evidence to 
support the jury's verdict?" 
In Defendant Griffiths' Reply Brief, he apparently agrees with that single 
issue since he has only stated one "additional" issue at p. 13 of his brief where 
he posits that there are "additional issues" i.e., "Whether Dr. Griffiths is entitled to 
attorneys' fees on appeal." Dr. Griffiths has not raised either causation or 
standard of care among the issues present in this appeal and is interested, 
apparently, only in an award of attorneys' fees to him based upon the "frivolity" of 
this appeal.1 
Defendant Curnow, on the other hand, - apparently unmindful that this is 
an appeal from a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b) I.R.C.P. 
- has attempted to shift the issue to 'Whether the district court correctly 
determined that Plaintiffs failed to present admissible evidence that, to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Curnow caused Michael Hall's 
death." This issue, on its face, has to do with causation only, apparently ignores 
any issues relating to standard of care and, additionally, is not the test on an 
appeal from the granting of a Rule 50(b) motion. 
1 A truly surprising assertion since not to file an appeal from a ruling granting a motion notwithstanding 
the verdict after nearly three years of discovery, eleven days of trial and a favorable jury verdict awarding 
significant damages would certainly constitute evidence to support a malpractice claim against tbe attorney 
Appellants maintain that there is a single question of law to be decided on 
this appeal. That question is whether there is substantial evidence upon which 
the jury could properly find a verdict in favor of the Appellants. Quick v. Crane, 
111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986) observed that in making a Rule 
50(b) motion "the defendants necessarily admitted the truth of all of the plaintiff's 
evidence and every legitimate inference that could be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff." At 763 citing Stephens v. Stems, 106 Idaho 
249, 252-253, 678 P.2d 41, 44-45 (1984). 
Watson v. Navistar International Transportation Corporation, 121 Idaho 
659, 661, 827 P.2d 656, 699 (1992) similarly held that "where there is conflicting 
evidence, the court is required [under Rule 50(b)] to construe all of the evidence 
in favor of the jury verdict, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, to 
determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. 
More recently, this Court has stated in Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional 
Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775, 786, 25 P.3d 88, 97 (2001) the following with 
respect to a motion for a directed verdict in a medical malpractice case: 
The evidence in this case was not uncontroverted; however, from 
our review of the record of the trial below, and drawing all 
inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable the non-
moving party, there was substantial evidence regarding proximate 
cause and damages to justify submitting the case to the jury. 
The standard is the same on a Rule 50(b) motion, and as stated in 
Hudson v. Cobbs, in ruling on a motion for judgment n.o.v. the trial court 
must view the facts as if the moving party has admitted the truth of all the 
non-moving party's evidence. 118 Idaho 474, 478, 797 P.2d 1322, 1326 
(1990). It is suggested that this rule of appellate review be kept 
uppermost in mind: All the Plaintiffs' evidence is true. 
C. WHAT EVIDENCE MUST BE REGARDED AS TRUE? 
Plaintiffs' direct evidence, not counting cross-examination, spans some 
885 pages of the transcript (Tr. 137-1022) and includes hundreds of pages of 
exhibits. It would take more space than is allowed to list all of the "true" facts 
Plaintiffs put into evidence. But keeping in mind the definitions of "substantial" as 
"not imaginary or illusory," "real," "important," considerable in quantity," 
(Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 1176) and "competent" as "proper 
or rightly pertinent" (Id. p. 268), we can list here enough to validate the jury's 
verdict. These facts are the same facts which the trial court must have somehow 
deemed "insubstantial" and "incompetent:" 
1. Michael Hall suffered a non-mortal wound, i.e., a dog bite. 
2. Michael Hall was not expected to die from the dog bite. 
3. Michael Hall did not die from the dog bite. 
4. Before Michael was sedated with Propofol, his heart, lungs 
and brain were in good condition, he had no known allergies 
and he was a good surgical candidate. Tr. p. 1926, II. 3-18. 
He had no hepatitis (Tr. p. 1978, II. 10-12), no jaundice (Tr. 
p. 1981, II. 11-13). He had all his immunizations (Tr. p. 
1027, II. 14-20). His heart and lungs were, on admission, 
found to be normal by Dr. Curnow. Tr. pp. 1029-1030. 
5. Dr. Groben, the pathologist, stated that Michael was in "good 
condition" and a "normal little boy." "There was no cardiac 
reason for him to die." Tr. p. 161, II. 9-10. There was no 
"structural abnormality with the heart." Id., II. 17-18. 
6. Examination of Michael's organs on autopsy revealed no 
pathology, disease or sickness. Tr. p. 164, II. 13-18. Tr. p. 
145, II. 6-22. No trauma or bruising was noted. Tr. p. 147, II. 
2-5. 
7. Dr. Smagula, the anesthesiologist, testified that aside from 
the dog bite Michael was a healthy little boy. Tr. p. 1809, II. 
1-3. 
8. Defendants' witness, Dr. Latchaw at Tr. 1643, II. 1-3 stated 
"There was nothing systemically abnormal about this boy." 
9. Oxygen and glucose are carried by the blood to the cells. 
10. Inside the cell there is a process called mitochondrial 
function which produces energy. Tr. p. 328, II. 6-25. 
11. A byproduct of this exchange is water which needs to be 
pumped out of the cell. Tr. p. 331, I. 24 - 332, I. 17. 
12. Insufficient energy production and low albumin creates 
cellular swelling because water cannot get out of cells. Tr. p. 
337. 
13. Cells break down if they are not oxygenated. Tr. p. 332. 
14. Blood pressure is an indicator of circulation. Tr. p. 246. 
15. Low hemoglobin means that the amount of oxygen being 
delivered to the cells is diminished. Tr. 340, IL 12-20. 
16. The liver manufactures proteins necessary for the circulation 
of the blood. Albumin is one of the proteins and a lack of 
albumin leads to cellular swelling. Tr. p. 734. 
17. When the heart is not pumping well, oxygen deprivation can 
result and liver functions can be adversely affected. Tr. p. 
247, IL 10-25. 
18. Cardiac arrhythmias decrease the amount of blood that the 
heart is pumping and the oxygen delivered to the brain is 
decreased. Tr. 352, II. 8-16. 
19. Propofol is a toxic drug and has toxic side effects. Tr. p. 
245, II. 10-25. 
20. Propofol lowers the blood pressure. Beals Tr. 245, I. 25. 
21. Propofol affects the contractility of the heart. The heart 
pumps less efficiently. Tr. p. 246, IL 13-18. 
22. When the contractile strength of the heart decreases, it 
reduces effective circulation of the blood. Beals Tr. 246, L 
16. 
23. If Propofol causes blood pressure to drop, this can be 
corrected. Tr. 334, II. 12-17. 
24. The low blood pressure Michael experienced was not 
corrected by the Defendants. Appendix 1, Appellants' Brief. 
25. When Michael's blood pressure was dangerously low, the 
Propofol dose was not decreased. Tr. 869, II. 17-19. 
26. Dr. Peck, a local radiologist, reported that Michael's cerebral 
edema was due to hypotension (low blood pressure). 
Exhibit 1, p. C00114. 
27. Michael's blood was deficient in hemoglobin and hemocrit. 
Tr. p. 361, I. 11 - 362, I. 3. 
28. Michael's blood pressure was life-threatening low during his 
stay in the ICU. Tr. p. 358, II. 17-21. 
29. Michael's liver was malfunctioning after 48 hours in the ICU. 
Tr. 364, II. 7-24. Liver damage can be caused by 
hypotension. Tr. p. 216, I. 25 - 217, I. 6. 
30. Michael's liver enzymes should have been in the range of 50 
to 80. In fact, they soared to 899, evidencing liver damage. 
Tr. p. 359, II. 3-7. 
31. Michael had a fever in the ICU indicating a greater oxygen 
need for his brain. There was evidence of kidney and 
intestinal damage as time went on. Tr. p. 359, II. 3-13. 
32. The brain takes more oxygen than any other tissue in the 
body to keep itself functional. Tr. p. 247, II. 15-18. 
33. There was evidence of kidney and intestine damage related 
to the long-term use of Propofol in Michael. Tr. 366-367. 
34. Michael developed an irregular heart beat in the ICU 
(arrhythmias). This causes a decrease of oxygen delivered 
by the blood. Tr. p. 352, II. 8-16. 
35. Michael's urine turned green. 
36. The hypotension caused by Propofol is associated with an 
inadequate supply of blood and oxygen to the brain cells. 
Tr. 341, II. 2-7. 
37. All experts agreed that Michael's immediate cause of death 
was a hypoxic ischemic event, i.e., inadequate blood flow 
and inadequate oxygen to the brain cells. Tr. pp. 149-150 
(Groben); Tr. p. 1280, II. 4-9 (Reichard). 
38. lschemia means inadequate blood flow to tissues. Tr. 339, 
II. 6-11. 
39. Hypoxic refers to an inadequate amount of oxygen available 
to the cell for its energy production to occur normally. Tr. 
338. 
40. Hemoglobin, oxygen and blood pressure are monitored in 
the ICU. Tr. 342. 
41. The low hemoglobin was not caused by Propofol but from a 
loss of blood at the surgical site. Tr. 354, I. 25. 
42. Lab tests are routinely done in the ICU to monitor critically ill 
children. Tr. 343. 
43. When the brain swells, the pressure within the skull can 
increase rapidly and dramatically. Tr. p. 845, II. 10-25. 
44. A small change in volume within the skull will result in a huge 
pressure and the brain cells are deprived of oxygen. Tr. 
337, II. 1-23. 
45. This increase in pressure because of an hypoxic ischemic 
event produces death and did cause Michael's death. Tr. 
pp. 150-151. 
46. A physician using Propofol as it was used in Michael's case 
would be acting below the standard of care. Tr. 509, I. 25. 
47. Sedation with Propofol for 92 hours is long-term sedation. 
Tr. 346. This is not indicated for children. 
48. Scientific research explains the connection between Propofol 
and swelling of the brain cells. Tr. 866, I. 5, 867, I. 5. 
49. The dose of Propofol used with Michael was excessive and 
never decreased. Tr. p. 449, II. 1-16. 
50. The Propofol caused or contributed significantly to the 
hypotension, and therefore, decrease in blood flow to 
vital organs in the body, including the brain, the heart, 
the liver, and other vital tissues. 
51. Propofol caused the lipemia that in all likelihood 
contributed to Michael's demise because of the fatty 
acids that would be produced. And in all likelihood, 
the Propofol also had a negative effect on the energy 
generation of cells in the body. 
52. These things are all in combination, especially with 
the low hemoglobin that the Propofol did not cause, 
but these events taking place simultaneously all 
resulted like a triple or a quadruple whammy, where 
they all resulted in diminished oxygen delivery to the 
brain, which ultimately caused the brain swelling, and 
also caused inadequate oxygen delivery to other 
organs in the body. 
53. The low hemoglobin, again, was caused by bleeding. 
In the presence of bleeding and the low blood 
pressure that's caused or contributed to by the 
bleeding itself, one would have to be particularly 
mindful of the Propofol-related drop in blood pressure, 
so if a person is bleeding and their hemoglobin is low 
and their blood pressure is low, that's the time to 
decrease the Propofol or turn it off, if, in fact, you 
have been using it to begin with, which is another 
question. 
54. These factors conspired, in a predictable fashion, to 
cause lethal organ injury, including brain injury. Tr. 
355 and 356. 
55. Propofol was a proximate cause of Michael's death. Tr. 452, 
II. 1-4. The conduct of each Defendant was also a proximate 
cause of Michael's death. Tr. p. 445, I. 25 - 448, I. 10. 
56. Dr. Hammer's testimony was based on basic medical 
science. Tr. 867, II. 6-11. 
57. The Propofol administered to Michael definitely caused or 
contributed to the low blood pressure, lipemia and toxicity to 
cells in Michael's body. Tr. p. 365, II. 2-20. 
58. A simple literature search by the Defendants in 2002 would 
have quickly yielded a series of articles regarding the 
hazards of Propofol in children for long-term sedation. Tr. 
875, II. 5-9. 
59. The United States Food and Drug Administration 
promulgated information in 2002 which contra-indicated the 
use of Propofol for long-term sedation of children in the ICU. 
This was a national prohibition. Tr. 841-842, I. 8. 
60. The anesthesiologist, Dr. Smagula, never recommended 
Propofol for Michael's long-term sedation nor was his advice 
ever sought in that regard. He did not approve of Michael 
being kept on Propofol for 92 hours in the ICU. Tr. p. 1810, 
I. 20-1813, I. 15. 
61. Dr. Hammer was familiar with the local standard of post-
surgical care of pediatric patients. Tr. pp. 376-440. 
62. Both of the Defendants fell below that standard. They chose 
a drug and maintained that drug for the sedation of Michael 
on a long-term basis when it was not indicated for that use. 
They did not acquaint themselves with the general properties 
of their drug of choice. They did not order sufficient lab tests 
to monitor organ toxicity. The lab reports they did order 
were not recognized properly. The Propofol was never 
titrated or decreased from a relatively high dose when 
Michael's blood pressure was low and there was evidence of 
damage to his organs. Tr. 445-451. 
If all of the above must be deemed true - and this list could go on - then it 
is submitted that the trial court erred in granting the Defendants' motions for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. There is more - much more - than a mere 
temporal connection between the application of Propofol and Michael's death. 
Swallow v. Emergency Med. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68 (2003) is 
inapposite. Weeks v. E. Idaho Health SeNices, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 
(2007) is, on the other hand, most helpful. 
In Weeks, IRE 702 was discussed noting "A qualified expert is one who 
possesses 'knowledge, skill, experience, training or education."' At 837, 839. 
Weeks teaches that the conclusions reached by an expert witness do not have to 
be universally accepted and that a medical doctor's opinions can be based on his 
own experience and research and a "chain of circumstances" from which the 
ultimate fact can be determined. Sheridan, supra, at 786 is in accord. That 
happened here, primarily as to Dr. Hammer's testimony but also to that of Dr. 
Groben. 
D. THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS WAS ON TRIAL. 
PROPOFOL ITSELF WAS NOT ON TRIAL. ITS USE WAS. 
Both Respondents - particularly Dr. Curnow - spend the majority of their 
time discussing whether or not Michael had signs of what has been labeled the 
"Propofol Infusion Syndrome," abbreviated as "PRIS." Respondents and the trial 
court were misguided in focusing on this issue. 
The Respondents' approach in attempting to show that there was no 
evidence of PRIS is really the promotion of a straw man. Having set up the straw 
man, the Respondents set out to show that there was little evidence that PRIS 
existed and that, ipso facto, Propofol was in no way implicated in Michael Hall's 
death. In so doing, Respondents are like tone-deaf people trying to sing, hoping 
that their bogus PRIS theory will compensate for an inability to find a key. 
The trial court bought into this straw man argument as is evident from its 
Memorandum Opinion entered on March 20, 2008. The trial court clearly 
weighed the evidence and concluded, improperly, "there is no substantial 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the long-term use of 
Propofol was the proximate cause of Michael Hall's cerebral edema." R. p. 132. 
(emphasis added). 2 Another example: "There is no proof that Propofol causes 
PRIS." R. p. 27. 
The Respondents and the trial court alike have failed to note that in the 
Complaint, R. pps. 20-22, filed by Michael Hall's mother and his estate, in the 
Plaintiffs' opening statement Tr. 6-38, in their closing argument, Tr. 2361-2397, 
and in their final argument Tr. 2469-2495, the thesis was never advanced that 
Michael Hall died as a consequence of or suffering all the symptoms of PRIS. 
PRIS is first brought up by defense counsel in evidence at Tr. 464, I. 15. Until 
then the term had not seen the light of day. 
The cause of Michael's death, overall, was the conduct of the Defendants. 
That conduct consisted not only of the selection of a drug that was not indicated 
for use for the long-term sedation of children, but also the failure, among other 
errors, to recognize or to treat the constant and dangerous low blood pressure 
which led to a comment by Dr. Peck, a local radiologist treating Michael at the 
time, that Michael's brain scan showed "extensive ischemic injury likely 
secondary to hypotension." Exhibit 1, p. C00114. 
The Respondents have joined with the trial court and totally ignore the 
abundant evidence from Dr. Graben, Mr. Beals, Dr. Hammer and all of the lab 
reports regarding very basic issues reflecting the lack of care or the inappropriate 
2 The erroneous focus ignores the jury instruction on proximate cause which did not require the jury to find 
that Propofol was ''the" cause of death or even "a" cause. The operative instructions were Nos. 5 and 6 
which focus on whether ''the acts of [the Defendants] which failed to meet the applicable standard of care 
were a proximate cause of Michael Hall's death." Propofol is nowhere mentioned in the entire set of jury 
care of Michael while intubated, sedated and helpless in the ICU. These basic 
items include the failure to control the obvious and dangerously low blood 
pressure, the failure to ensure adequate oxygenation of the tissues, the inability 
of the blood to provide enough oxygen to the brain, the low hemoglobin, the low 
hemocrit, and signs of liver and kidney damage, all of which were imposed upon 
this little boy who unfortunately and as a consequence was unable to reach his 
third birthday. Propofol most probably played a part in producing the 
unrecognized and untreated adverse symptoms suffered by Michael Hall. But 
causation in this case is related to the combination of a) Propofol, b) the Propofol 
dosage, c) the length of time Propofol was administered, d) dangerously low 
blood pressure which was constant, e) low hemocrit, f) low hemoglobin, g) heart 
problems which developed, and h) liver damage as evidenced by elevated 
enzymes, kidney damage, intestinal damage and the ultimate cerebral edema, 
which was recognized by everyone to be the immediate cause of death. 
Propofol, used properly, is a useful sedative. But it must be skillfully used. 
Like any other substance it can be misused or overused. Too much morphine 
will cause death. A cocktail before dinner is benign. A quart of bourbon whiskey, 
quickly consumed, can stop the heart. So to analyze this case in terms of an 
issue not propounded by Plaintiffs and then to focus on only one element among 
a constellation of causative agents is very misguided. 
E. WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE LINKING 
THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS TO MICHAEL'S DEATH? 
To ask this question really is to answer it. The trial court itself validated 
Dr. Hammer's expertise. "Dr. Hammer is a board-certified pediatrician and 
anesthesiologist with a sub-board in pediatric critical care. He is on the faculty of 
the Stanford Medical School where he is a professor of anesthesiology and 
pediatrics. He is the author of numerous articles and a textbook on pediatric 
intensive care." R. p. 116. The trial court also observed with respect to Dr. 
Hammer: "He is a gifted and well-trained physician who practices and teaches at 
one of the foremost medical centers in the world." R. p. 133. 
While Dr. Hammer indicated that Propofol began a chain of events which 
caused, over time, an inability of Michael to process oxygen which, in turn, led to 
multiple adverse physiological effects including the swelling of his brain and 
ultimate brain death, Dr. Hammer did not focus solely on Propofol as a direct or 
sole cause of the death. Rather, Dr. Hammer, utilizing his medical training and 
his knowledge of scientific areas such as anesthesiology, biology, microbiology, 
chemistry, toxicology, pathology, physiology as well as basic medicine, explained 
carefully the "chain of circumstances" which led to this tragic death. As stated in 
the Complaint which, long ago, started this process of justice, the care given to 
Michael was rendered negligently and caused his death. The drug Propofol was 
misused in this case by its application with a child over such a long time, and, as 
the evidence showed, caused extreme hypotension, fever, low hemoglobin, low 
hemocrit, liver and other organ damage, each contributing to limiting the amount 
of oxygen available for utilization by Michael's brain. But Propofol was not on 
trial. Astra Zeneca, the manufacturer of Propofol, was never a defendant in this 
case. Dr. Hammer admitted that Propofol is a useful sedative and can be used 
safely for short-term sedation of children. 
In Appellants' opening brief, it was argued that the trial court erred in 
focusing on the fact that Propofol was not shown to be "the" proximate cause of 
Michael's death. That was not the test according to the jury instructions given by 
the Court. Instruction No. 12 stated as follows: 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, 
in natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the 
damage complained of. It need not be the only cause. It is 
sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss 
or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage 
likely would have occurred anyway. There may be one or more 
proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of two 
or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial 
factors in bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a 
proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which each 
contributes to the injury. 
This is the basic IDJI pattern jury instruction approved by this Court. The 
trial court, therefore, joined eagerly by the Respondents, erroneously threw up a 
hurdle that the Appellants did not have to clear, i.e., that Propofol had to be "the" 
cause of Michael's death. In Dr. Curnow's brief, for example, at pps. 18, 25 and 
33, the argument is made again and again that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict that the long-term use of Propofol was "the" proximate 
cause of Michael's death. That was not necessary to the jury's verdict. Then, 
without any citation to the record, at p. 25 of the Curnow Brief, the statement is 
made "despite the lack of any scientific support for his opinions in the medical 
literature, Dr. Hammer insisted that Propofol was the cause of Michael Hall's fatal 
cerebral edema." Curnow Brief, p. 25. Again, that is not true. The reason there 
is no defendant's citation to this "insistence" by Dr. Hammer is that Dr. Hammer 
has never insisted that Propofol was "the" cause of Michael Hall's fatal cerebral 
edema. All that Dr. Hammer did was trace the chain of circumstances 
backwards from the cerebral edema through the difficulties Michael was having 
in the ICU which went unrecognized and untreated. Propofol was "a" cause of 
the death, but certainly it was not isolated from the post-surgical conduct and 
neglect of both physicians. 
Dr. Hammer was very careful in describing not a theory but scientific fact 
or series of facts leading to the reasons for lack of oxygen available for Michael's 
brain, the brain being the most needy organ and the most sensitive to the lack of 
oxygen. Significantly, none of the Defendants' experts testified that Dr. Hammer 
or Mr. Beals were wrong about the lack of oxygen, the lack of sufficient APT to 
provide energy, the cellular processing of oxygen, the inability of Michael's brain 
cells to excrete fluid leading to the edema and the like. All had to agree that 
Michael died as a result of a hypoxic ischemic event (swelling of the brain). 
Significantly, each of the Respondents' many experts stated that they had no 
explanation as to why Michael died.3 
The trial court states erroneously that there is no "substantial evidence" to 
support the jury's conclusion "that the long term use of Propofol was the 
proximate cause of Michael Hall's cerebral edema." R. p. 132. (emphasis 
3 Defendant Griffiths argues incorrectly that his $9,000 per day expert, Dr. Lachtaw, found a canse of 
death. That is nonsense. The most that could be said is that Dr. Lachtaw said that he"speculated" that there 
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added). Is Dr. Hammer's reliance on his knowledge of anesthesiology, biology, 
microbiology, cellular function, pediatric critical care, chemistry, physiology, 
toxicology and pathology, a species of voodoo or witchcraft? Or are these areas 
not themselves branches of substantive scientific knowledge? Is not the critical 
care of pediatric patients in the ICU something that is based on science? Did the 
trial court forget about the toxicology testimony from the toxicologist, Mr. Beals, 
or the pathology testing from the pathologists? Are these not sciences? 
Neither the Respondents nor the trial court say anything about the 
testimony of Dr. Groben or Mr. Beal, the toxicologist, who both testified at length. 
Propofol is toxic. It compromises the heart which pumps less blood. Lack of 
oxygen causes liver damage. There is an important function of the liver which is 
to make protein and albumin. Tr. 249. Prolonged hypotension causes an 
"inotropic effect" and the lack of albumin defeats the normal "osmotic tension" 
which allows fluid to flow through the cell's membrane walls and return on the 
venous side of the circulatory process. A lack of albumin leads to retention of 
fluid in the cell and the cells swell. The brain is the most sensitive to this process 
because it is encapsulated in the skull and the pressure goes up rapidly. Tr. pp. 
733-735. 
If the liver is damaged and not producing albumin and protein, that is 
signaled by an increase of enzymes called ALT or AST "and relatively simple 
laboratory tests are used to measure this on a routine basis." Tr. p. 736, I. 11 -
737, I. 3. If these enzymes rise that "is indicative of damage to the tissues." Tr. 
737, II. 10-18. Thus, Propofol can affect the metabolism of the body in several 
ways. Tr. 742, II. 9-17. Mr. Beals went on at great length to explain the 
chemistry, biochemistry, cellular microbiology, the development of lipemia, the 
concept of free fatty acids and how Propofol inhibits the process of the free fatty 
acid chains getting inside the cell where they are needed. 
This is heady stuff. Too much of it will cause a lay person's eyes to glaze 
over. But it is scientific information about how the body works in both gross and 
submolecular terms. Yet, the trial court seems to dismiss all of this because it is 
not at all mentioned in the court's memorandum decision. Why? Mr. Beals had 
a Master's Degree in toxicology, he taught at BSU, he managed the Schools of 
Medical Technology at both St. Luke's and St. Alphonsus in Boise for many 
years. Tr. p. 749. He was also a clinical chemist and toxicologist at the Boise 
VA Medical Center for more than twenty years prior to his retirement. Even a 
quick review of Mr. Beal's evidence will indicate that a solid foundation was laid 
for subsequent testimony by Dr. Hammer. And, please note, this was a scientific 
foundation if there ever was one. 
Respondents argue and the trial court placed great weight on the lack of 
evidence that the "literature" has not specifically coupled the use of Propofol with 
the end result of cerebral edema. But where is the evidence in the record from 
the Respondents' experts which indicates that there is any evidence anywhere 
that a little boy who has not yet attained the age of three was subjected to an 
abuse of Propofol, i.e., a high dosage of Propofol for approximately 92 hours 
coupled with consistently and dangerously low blood pressure, fever, low 
hemocrit, low hemoglobin, demonstrable liver damage 4 and cardiac 
arrhythmias? There is none of this evidence and for obvious reasons. This 
abuse and neglect is beneath the standard of care. Doctors do not subject their 
pediatric patients to this constellation of symptoms without correction. 
There is probably no literature indicating that placing a little boy in a hot, 
unventilated, small closet without food or water for five or six days can cause the 
death of that little boy. That is because, thank God, this circumstance is not a 
daily event as, for example, was the ingestion of Cipro or Benedactin by 
thousands upon thousands of patients which made research and studies 
possible with reference to those drugs as reported in Daubert or Swallow. But do 
we need such literature? In this jurisdiction, can our medical doctors specializing 
in pediatric critical care not testify as to the cause of death? Are all death 
certificates in this state signed by a doctor of medicine invalid? It was not within 
the standard of care here, there or anywhere to put a small boy on a ventilator 
and sedate him with Propofol for 92 hours in spite of the boy's compromised vital 
signs. That was the evidence which must be regarded as true. 
None of the many medical doctors who testified in this case had ever used 
Propofol for the long-term sedation of children in the ICU. If no medical doctors 
were subjecting their pediatric patients to 92 hours of sedation with Propofol and 
ignoring a dangerous trend in vital signs, then where are the data to do research, 
to write articles and to have those articles peer-reviewed? Do we really need 
scientific, peer-reviewed journals before we can hold accountable the person 
4 Dr. Smith, one of the Defendants' experts, admitted that hypotension can also cause liver damage. Tr. p. 
who placed the little boy in this dangerous situation? Is it not permissible to have 
a medical doctor state his opinion that the lack of oxygen caused the death? It 
certainly was admissible in the judgment of the trial court because the opinion 
was allowed to be stated multiple times at different points in the trial. Or, with 
reference to this case, do we have to have multiple experiments where dozens of 
little boys are placed in life-threatening circumstances similar to that of Michael 
Hall followed by peer-reviewed journal articles commenting on the ugly results 
before we can ever conclude that the care - or lack of care - that Michael 
received was the cause of his death? 
Respondents want to embrace the Daubert decision (Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993) as creating 
inviolate standards and observing that "[s]cientific methodology today is based on 
generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, 
this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human 
inquiry." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. Are the Respondents indicating that it would 
be ethical or wise or humane to replicate the facts of Michael's subjection to 
Propofol at the same dosage for the same amount of time and under the same 
oxygen-deprived circumstances without correcting any of the distress signals to 
see what will happen? Nazi Germany condoned such experiments. Michael's 
mother and other mothers in these United States would disagree with such an 
approach.5 It is not dispositive, therefore, or even important that Dr. Hammer 
acknowledged that he was unaware of any direct correlation in the medical 
' And it does not strain the imagination that our federal and state courts at all levels would similarly 
literature between the long-term use of Propofol and death caused exclusively by 
cerebral edema. See, e.g., Curnow Brief, p. 25; Griffiths' Brief, p. 36. If 
Michael's last hours on this earth are not replicated by the actions of other 
physicians with other little boys because they know better, then that lack of 
literature means nothing more or less than the Defendants were out of bounds in 
Michael's case. 
F. DR. HAMMER DID. NOT SIMPLY RELY ON INFORMATION 
PUBLISHED AFTER MICHAEL'S DEATH. THAT ARGUMENT IS 
SIMPLISTIC. 
The Trial court at R. p. 125 indicated, incorrectly, that "Dr. Hammer relied 
on two sources in forming his opinion but neither study identifies cerebral edema 
alone in young children as a cause of death even associated with Propofol." 
That finding is not correct. 
While Dr. Hammer admitted on cross-examination that he referenced the 
two articles brought up only on cross-examination, on his direct examination he 
referenced at least a dozen journal articles available in 2002 or earlier as well as 
the 2002 Physician's Desk Reference. Tr. 218, II. 11-24. While Dr. Hammer 
utilized these articles to illustrate his testimony, his testimony was not an 
application of these articles to Michael's death in the exclusion of the laboratory 
reports monitoring results and the autopsy reports - all coupled with the long-
term application of Propofol. 
G. THE TRIAL COURT IMPERMISSIBL Y WEIGHED THE EVIDENCE. 
In rejecting Dr. Hammer's opinions as lacking "scientific evidence," the 
Court referenced the testimony of Dr. Reed who was one of the Respondents' 
witnesses, R. p. 127. Virtually the entire Memorandum Decision authored by the 
trial court indicates a weighing of the evidence strongly indicating the Court 
simply did not agree with the jury's verdict. 
What the trial court has confused is its function as a "gatekeeper" and its 
function as a trial court sitting on a Rule 50(b) motion. In the latter situation the 
court is to determine whether reasonable minds could have reached the same 
conclusion as the jury. Hudson, supra, at 478. The court, in weighing the 
evidence, never reached that point. Instead, the court became a post-trial jury of 
one. 
In the first instance, a court as gatekeeper can keep out of evidence those 
opinions not sufficiently supported by scientific or technical knowledge. In the · 
second instance, a court has to look at the evidence that was actually admitted 
and considered by the jury on a "reasonable minds" standard. Here, Dr. 
Hammer's opinions were preliminarily subjected to a great deal of argument in 
support of objections by the Defendants against admissibility. In due course, the 
trial court determined that Dr. Hammer's opinions were admissible under I.R.E 
702. The jury heard those opinions. There were no hip shots or giant leaps of 
faith taken by Dr. Hammer. His opinions were well-reasoned and, as found in the 
record, based on scientific knowledge. Those opinions were never stricken by 
the court. 
Six months after the jury came in with a Plaintiffs' verdict, and without the 
benefit of a trial transcript, the trial court seems to have decided that Dr. 
Hammer's opinions should be ignored. Perhaps the trial court forgot Mr. Beals' 
and Dr. Groben's foundational evidence. How else can one explain the Court's 
comment at R. p. 131 "the evidence on cause is grossly insufficient." There was 
no evidence from the defense experts that Propofol absolutely could not produce 
Michael's brain death. No defense expert was critical of Dr. Hammer's analysis 
regarding the effect of Propofol on the heart, the dangers of critically low blood 
pressure, the cellular function leading to the rupture and death of brain cells, the 
importance of albumin in allowing nature's osmotic effect in the cell walls. As 
previously stated, however, there is nothing in the literature to indicate that the 
exact set of circumstances that Michael was subjected to has ever been 
encountered by other children. Knowledgeable and careful physicians do not do 
what the Defendants here did. 
First, physicians in the shoes of the Respondents were, in 2002, warned 
by the PDR not to use the medication for the long-term sedation of children. That 
warning certainly reduced the number of children who receive Propofol for long-
term sedation to the point of zero. Second, there is no evidence in the record 
that any physician anywhere would observe and then allow the incredibly low 
blood pressures suffered by Michael all during his stay in the ICU while he was 
under the Propofol sedation. In fact, as soon as the Propofol was stopped by Dr. 
Reynolds when Michael began to exhibit damage to his heart, the blood pressure 
did improve. But by that time, as observed by the radiologist, Dr. Peck, there 
was brain damage secondary (caused by) to hypotension. Exhibits 1, p. C00114. 
One must think that radiology, too, is a species of scientific knowledge. 
In relying on the lack of medical literature coupling Propofol directly with 
cerebral edema, the trial court has clearly weighed the evidence. On one side of 
the scale is a lack of literature versus the other side of the scale which is Dr. 
Hammer's, Dr. Groben's and Mr. Beal's well-reasoned opinions. These opinions 
were based on this exact case and were expressed both as to factual foundation 
and ultimate opinion over hundreds of pages of the transcript. On the other side 
of the scale, there is an absence of evidence indicating that any child had been 
subject to that which Michael was subject to. Also on that side of the scale is the 
fact that none of the Respondents' experts could testify as to why Michael died. 
Yet, the trial court not only utilizes this scale in impermissibly weighing the 
evidence, but finds that the scale tips in favor of the Respondents based on the 
false and misleading issue of PRIS put forward by the Respondents and the 
erroneous notion that the Plaintiffs had to prove that the Propofol was "the" cause 
of death. That weighing of the evidence has been forbidden by this Court in a 
Rule 50(b) motion as previously noted. 
While incorrectly chastising Dr. Hammer for utilizing a 2003 article which 
helped to explain his position on cellular function, the trial court itself at R. p. 128 
in fn. 6 cites to a 2005 article not in evidence which "is designed to aid physicians 
in evaluating the claims made in different studies." The trial court clearly used 
resources unavailable to the jury and not in evidence to assist it in weighing the 
evidence. This is even beyond weighing evidence - it is adding "evidence" six 
months after the jury was discharged. 
In attacking Dr. Hammer's opinions as unsound, both the trial court and 
the Respondents have done nothing more than point out that the medical 
literature does not reflect a death of a small boy where both cerebral edema and 
Propofol are involved. Without being unnecessarily redundant, Appellants would 
offer that it is not just the Propofol that is involved in this case, but a continuation 
of that sedative drug for days on end in sedating a helpless, small child who was 
intubated and could not cry out for help. It was not merely the initial and 
continued ignorance of both Defendants in not doing the slightest amount of 
research regarding their sedative drug of choice - which research would have 
caused them to recognize the caution flags raised by lab reports and monitors. It 
was not just the refusal to heed the warnings of a nurse who confronted Dr. 
Curnow and questioned the use of this drug on this child.6 It was not simply the 
failure of the Defendant physicians to appropriately address consistent and 
extreme hypotension, fever, low hemoglobin, liver enzymes far from normal, low 
hemocrit, and signs of kidney damage, each one being an indicator of low 
amounts of oxygen available for Michael's utilization. It was a collection of these 
things that constituted errors of both omission and commission and which 
supported Dr. Hammer's opinions. 
The Respondents, other than carping about Dr. Hammer's opinions and 
methodology, could have pointed to something in the record indicating that Dr. 
Hammer's opinions were not reasonable or not supported by basic medical 
science. This they have failed to do. The Respondents had many high-paid 
experts who did not attack Dr. Hammer's theories of oxygen deficiency which 
caused the hypoxic ischemic brain event. In fact, they could not. As Dr. 
Hammer himself testified, this was not "rocket science." Rather, he was testifying 
about basic care in the ICU, "things we learned in medical school, things we think 
about directly or indirectly every day, especially in the Intensive Care Unit where 
we are thinking a lot about making sure that the tissues in the body have enough 
oxygen, the right amount of glucose, the laboratory values are monitored, blood 
pressure is very important, those sorts of things." Tr. p. 353, II. 6-14. Not "rocket 
science," perhaps, but science nevertheless and well within the ambit of Rule 
702. • 
H. THE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO THE 
ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING OPINION EVIDENCE ON CAUSATION 
AND STANDARD OF CARE. 
In Appellants' opening brief, Appellants cited Grover v. Isom, 137 Idaho 
770, 774, 53 P.3d 821, 825 (2002) to illustrate that in a medical malpractice case 
"whether a witness is qualified as an expert is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion." See, also, Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 35 156 P.3d 533, 536 
(2007). 
Dr. Hammer was allowed to testify. He was deemed qualified to give an 
expert opinion and allowed to state his opinions despite strenuous and very 
lengthy objections by the Respondents after which the court ruled that Dr. 
Hammer could testify and could state his opinions. Neither of the Respondents 
on this appeal has argued this was an abuse of discretion by the court. The 
evidence stands as admitted. Although it is supposed to be deemed "true," that 
evidence is now being attacked on appeal in an attempt to have this Court 
second-guess the trial court which can only be done if the trial court abused its 
discretion. That argument has not even been made. The only real question is 
whether Dr. Hammer's opinions, taken with the other evidence at trial, constitutes 
substantial and competent evidence. If, as Respondents argue, Dr. Hammer's 
testimony is nothing more than speculation, then no physician's testimony at trial 
regarding his or her diagnosis of a medical condition or cause of death could 
ever be relied upon to support a jury verdict. 
I. A MERE TEMPORAL CONNECTION OR RELATIONSHIP DID NOT 
FORM THE BASIS FOR DR. HAMMER'S OPINION. 
From the foregoing, we can see that Dr. Hammer did not base his 
evidence on "a mere temporal relationship" as alleged by the trial court. In other 
words, Dr. Hammer did not fail to analyze the causal steps between a ninety-two 
hour intubation and sedation under the influence of Propofol and the cerebral 
hypoxic ischemic event. Simple reference to the transcript will spike this weak 
argument, proffered by Respondents and erroneously accepted by the trial court. 
J. STANDARD OF CARE FOR DR. CURNOW AND DR. GRIFFITHS 
WAS VIOLATED. 
Dr. Hammer testified that his opinions on the breach of standard of care 
were held with reasonable medical certainty, that he actually held an opinion 
regarding the failure of each of the Defendants to meet the applicable standard of 
practice and that he had actual knowledge of the applicable community standard 
in June of 2002. Tr. pp. 378-379. The trial court ruled that Dr. Hammer had 
familiarized himself with the local standard of care in like communities and that 
his opinions were admissible. What Dr. Hammer had done, coupled with his own 
knowledge, was sufficient to lay a foundation for his standard of care opinions. 
The standards are those standards basic in medicine and, in this case, are 
taught in medical school. Tr. 439, II. 4-19. Both Dr. Curnow and Dr. Griffiths 
were responsible for Michael Hall's post-surgical care. Each agreed that he had 
a direct responsibility. Each agreed that medical doctors are expected to know 
generally the contraindications and properties of the drugs which they prescribe 
for their patients. Yet, here we have neither Dr. Curnow nor Dr. Griffiths ever 
taking the smallest step to familiarize themselves with the application of the drug 
Propofol, not for short-term surgeries, but for prolonged sedation of a small child 
in the ICU.7 Research tools were available to both of these physicians via the 
PDR and computers, but neither did the slightest thing to take advantage of 
those tools. Nurse Crockett recorded in the nursing notes which were available 
to both physicians that she questioned the use of Propofol for this child. She was 
7 Even after receiving a warning from Nurse Crockett, Dr. Curnow did no research on Propofol. Tr. p. 
1052, 11. 17-21. Dr. Griffiths similarly did nothing to acquaint himselfregarding the properties and contra-
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ignored, her opinions dismissed out of ignorance. But she was correct. The 
doctors were not. Clearly, both Defendants had errors of omission and 
commission in the selection of this drug for long-term use. They did not even 
arrange for an anesthesiologist to monitor Michael in the ICU on a routine basis. 
Tr. p. 1049, I. 23 -1050, I. 5. 
Additionally, and as significant evidence of the 2002 standard of care, no 
physician who testified at trial uses Propofol for long-term sedation of children. 
None had any experience with it as a long-term sedative for children. None knew 
of any physicians in their hospital or locale who were using Propofol for the long-
term sedation of children. That, alone, constitutes evidence of the standard of 
care not only in Boise (Dr. Curnow, Dr. Griffiths, Dr. Smagula, Dr. Smith, Dr. 
Vestal) but also in Alabama (Dr. Georgeson), in California (Dr. Latchaw), in New 
Mexico (Dr. Reichard) in Oregon (Dr. Silan), and in South Carolina (Dr. 
Johnston).8 No doubt this lack of use was because of the many medical journals 
which, by 2002, had cautioned against the use of Propofol for the long-term 
sedation of children. Tr. p. 842, I. 20 - 843, I. 11. The PDR and FDA warnings 
also had national applications. 
Both physician Defendants then failed to monitor the patient for 
appropriate blood pressure, glucose, and other adverse side effects. Tr. 446, II. 
5-15. These numbers in the lab reports do not lie. They are not arbitrary. They 
are not insubstantial. The numbers on the lab tests are generated by scientific 
instruments. Respondents have not argued - nor can they - that the blood 
8 As previously stated there were no other pediatric surgeons or pediatric plastic surgeons in Idaho so, 
among other sources, Dr. Hammer familiarized himself with the standard of post- surgical care in Eugene, 
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pressure readings, the lab reports, the autopsy report from the pathologist who 
actually saw Michael's body shortly after his death, the nurse's notes, the PDR 
entry stating that Propofol is not indicated for pediatric use - are not competent 
and substantial evidence. They support the testimony of Dr. Hammer. They 
support the verdict. 
Dr. Curnow argues that he did monitor the patient. That may be. But he 
did not monitor his patient carefully and with a sufficient awareness so that he 
could detect danger signals, or if he did detect them, he did nothing to correct the 
underlying problem. Dr. Curnow argues in his brief that he monitored for signs of 
PRIS. That is patently untrue since Dr. Curnow did not know anything about 
PRIS or the long-term application of Propofol until after this unfortunate death 
occurred. Dr. Curnow had to admit at trial that he had never used Propofol either 
before or after Michael Hall's death for the long-term sedation of children in the 
ICU. How, then, could he monitor for PRIS? More importantly, how could he not 
monitor for basic vital signs - signals of a deprivation of energy - producing 
oxygen being utilized in a normal fashion? Dr. Curnow not only admitted that he 
did not ever use Propofol for the long-term sedation of children, he did not even 
know what the dosage should be. Tr. p. 1042, II. 2-10. He thus violated his own 
self-acknowledged standard regarding the knowledge a physician should 
possess when his or her patient is being medicated. 
Dr. Griffiths, too, was unfamiliar with Propofol and had never before 
ordered it for the sedation of a child. Tr. p. 1091, II. 11-14. He agreed that "when 
a doctor of medicine orders a drug for a patient, he or she should know generally 
the properties and contra-indications of the drug." Tr. p. 1092, II. 12-17. Yet, he 
never changed his order for the drug and even while noting the extremely low 
blood pressure, and other low values he never reduced or stopped the drug. Tr. 
p. 1107, II. 20-24. 
Dr. Griffiths might be a good pediatric plastic surgeon possessing 
sufficient skills when it comes to hands-on surgical procedures. As previously 
stated, however, the criticism of Dr. Griffiths comes not from his unsuccessful 
attempt to revascularize the piece of flesh that the dog had removed from 
Michael's cheek. 9 On the contrary, what Dr. Griffiths attempted so poorly was, 
among other things, monitoring Michael in the ICU on a post-surgical basis in a 
location to which he had discharged Michael rather than discharging him to the 
pediatric ICU at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, a nearby medical center 
specializing in pediatric care and to keep him on a drug not indicated for children. 
The ICU at St. Alphonsus was not a pediatric ICU, and Michael was mixed in with 
adult patients and subject to the care of nurses who may or may not have been 
especially attuned to children's needs. Dr. Hammer was critical of the failure of 
both Defendants to seek out a pediatric intensivist to care for Michael in the ICU. 
Neither Dr. Curnow nor Dr. Griffiths could provide that level of care. Dr. Curnow 
knew that Dr. Christiansen, a pediatric intensivist, who practiced at St. Luke's, 
was available but did not involve him in Michael's ICU care (Tr. pp. 1034-1035; 
1045-47) even though Dr. Curnow thought Dr. Christiansen was an "excellent" 
physician based on his personal knowledge. 
9 This attempt included placing leeches ou Michael's face so as to draw blood through the wouud. The 
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Dr. Griffiths was also forced to admit at trial that there was no "quarterback" 
regarding the post-surgical care of Michael (Tr. p. 1112, II. 8-9), that he had 
never used Propofol, that he did nothing to educate himself about the danger 
signals involved in using the drug and that, yes, he was equally responsible for 
Michael's post-surgical care including, but not limited to, the monitoring of his 
vital signs. Tr. p. 2239, II. 19-21. That monitoring was done poorly, missing 
those basic signs and symptoms which are taught in medical school. 
Additionally, Dr. Griffiths breached the standard of care by not giving the 
anesthesiologist sufficient information about his plan of care. Tr. 489, I. 19 - 490, 
I. 24. 
The cases cited by Dr. Griffiths in his Brief all involve situations where the 
expert proffered by plaintiff was not allowed to testify because of a lack of 
familiarity with the standard of care. Here, after exhaustive argument in pre-trial 
hearings and at trial, Judge Bail allowed Dr. Hammer to testify regarding the 
basic care standards involving basic medicine which should have been observed. 
That was not an abuse of discretion. 
In Appellants' opening brief, pps. 40--42, the familiarization by Dr. Hammer 
of the local standard of care was recited and another recitation is not necessary 
here. Clearly, Dr. Hammer had sufficient information about the local standard as 
well as the activities or omissions of both Dr. Curnow and Dr. Griffiths to express 
an opinion on that subject. Dr. Hammer did know the standard of care applicable 
to these surgeons involved in pediatric post-surgical care and testified at length 
that standard of care in the application of basic medicine was violated. This is 
similar to the court's ruling in Grover v. Isom. The post-surgical care and 
monitoring required was "basic medicine" and the Defendants did not meet it. 
Additionally, the PDR is clearly a national standard. Tr. 841. The FDA 
prohibition is an additional national standard. Id. The use of Propofol violated 
these standards when a boy not yet three years of age was sedated with the 
drug for 92 hours even while he showed signs of distress and decline. 
K. ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL. 
In an earlier footnote in this Reply Brief, it is stated that under the 
circumstances existing here, the failure to file and to prosecute an appeal in this 
case would be evidence of professional negligence. This action followed the 
death of a little boy in 2002. Many months and years of discovery followed the 
filing of the Complaint in 2004. The trial was held in 2007, and lasted eleven 
days and saw nineteen expert witnesses from various scientific disciplines testify 
on both sides. The Plaintiffs evidence was both substantial and competent as 
evidenced elsewhere in this briefing exercise. The jury's verdict was for the 
Plaintiff and substantial damages were awarded. To state as the Respondents 
state that the Appellants are simply asking an appellate court to now second-
guess the trial court or that this appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation is inappropriate. It is submitted that 
Respondents' attorneys know better. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the jury's verdict should be upheld on the basis 
of Plaintiffs' evidence at trial - evidence both substantial and competent. The 
truth of this evidence must be admitted. The decision of the trial court should, 
therefore, be reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the 
Plaintiffs nunc pro tune consistent with the jury's verdict of September 19, 2007. 
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